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Abstract
Most macroeconomic models are based on the assumption of a sin-
gle homogeneous consumption good. In the present paper we consider
a model with two goods: a basic good and a luxury good. We then ap-
ply this assumption to a standard general equilibrium heterogeneous
agent model. We nd a substantial reduction in precautionary sav-
ings compared to a standard model. The eect on wealth inequality
turns out to be ambiguous and to depend on the size of the assumed
earnings risk.
Keywords: precautionary savings, wealth inequality, luxury consumption,
non-homothetic utility
JEL Codes: E21
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1 Introduction
Models with a large number of ex-ante identical agents with standard
preferences subject to uninsurable, idiosyncratic shocks to earnings are a key
tool used to study, among else, two questions that are relevant for macroeco-
nomics, that is, what is the size of precautionary savings and what accounts
for the large observed dierences in wealth holdings among households. In
this paper we use the general framework mentioned above to assess the role
played by non-homothetic preferences that make a distinction between basic
and luxury consumption, in determining the volume of precautionary savings
and in shaping the distribution of wealth, and hence, their contribution to
answering those two important macroeconomic questions.
Non homothetic preferences have been recently used to improve the per-
formance of portfolio choice models by Wachter and Yogo (2010) and to help
understanding the equity premium puzzle by Ait-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo
(2004). Other authors like Ikeda (2006) studied models where luxury con-
sumption induces a preference for wealth and explored the consequences of
taxation of luxury consumption for capital accumulation. The distinction
between luxury and basic consumption has even been used by Dalgin, Mi-
tra and Trindade (2004) to improve the understanding of international trade
patterns. Despite all this work with non-homothetic preferences, their impli-
cations for the determination of precautionary savings and for the shape of
the wealth distribution have been neglected. Filling up this gap is precisely
the purpose of the present paper.
The economies studied in this research are in most respect standard. They
feature a continuum of innitely lived ex-ante identical agents. Agents re-
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ceive an exogenous stochastic stream of earnings that cannot be insured due
to incomplete markets. They have access to a single risk-free asset that they
can use to smooth consumption in the face of variable earnings, subject to a
borrowing constraint. As a result of dierent histories of realizations of the
earnings shock they will be ex-post heterogeneous. The model is closed by a
standard neoclassical production function. It does not feature any aggregate
uncertainty, hence we can focus on studying stationary equilibria. The key
innovation of the model is the assumption that there are two consumption
goods: a basic good and a luxury good. The basic good has an expenditure
elasticity less than unity while the luxury good has an expenditure elasticity
greater than unity so that its share is rising in total expenditures. In order
to obtain this result we use an additive logarithmic intra-temporal utility
function dened over the two goods. Following Wachter and Yogo (2010) we
calibrate its parameters so as to match the median share of basic consumption
in total expenditures and the gradient of the share with respect to quartiles
of the expenditure distribution. We then simulate several economies charac-
terized by a dierent amount of earnings risk under the standard assumption
of homothetic preferences over a single good and under the assumption of
non-homothetic preferences over two goods. These economies are otherwise
equally parameterized. We nd that precautionary savings is reduced under
all earnings processes. The reduction is always signicant and may be very
large when earnings risk is large. With respect to the wealth distribution,
the sign of the eect of introducing this class of preferences is not univocally
determined: wealth concentration decreases for moderate levels of earnings
risk but increases when earnings risk is large. In both cases though, quanti-
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tatively the change in wealth concentration is not big. Overall then we can
say that these preferences are important to understand aggregate savings
but do not seem to represent a clear step forward towards the explanation of
the long standing issue of wealth concentration, especially at the top of the
distribution.
The intuition for the reduction in the size of precautionary savings is that
if the model with homothetic utility and the one with non-homothetic utility
are equally parameterized, agents in the latter model will be on average less
risk-averse because risk aversion declines from a common value as wealth,
hence the share of luxuries in total consumption, increases. Wealthy agents,
who carry out most of the saving are less risk-averse in the non-homothetic
model, hence they reduce their precautionary savings, thus depressing sav-
ings in the aggregate. As for the wealth distribution, the two goods with
non-homothetic utility introduce two forces operating in opposite directions.
On the one hand poor agents who consume a smaller proportion of luxuries
are more risk averse than richer agents hence have stronger precautionary
motives. This works towards a more equal distribution of wealth. On the
other hand the elasticity of inter temporal substitution is higher for wealth-
ier agents who can thus more easily cut consumption in the face of negative
earnings shocks. This factor works towards a more concentrated wealth dis-
tribution. Which of the two forces prevails is a quantitative issue that turns
out not to be univocally determined.
The current paper is related to several strands of literature. First it is
related to the literature that has tried to quantify the impact of earnings risk
on wealth accumulation in the context of models with a large number of ex-
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ante identical agents subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. This literature
includes early work in partial equilibrium like Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1994) and Carroll and Samwick (1997) and in general equilibrium like Aiya-
gari (1994) and Huggett (1996). It also includes more recent work that uses a
structural estimation approach in life-cycle partial equilibrium economies like
Cagetti (2000) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Second it is related to the
large body of literature that, in the same framework, has tried to understand
the wealth distribution. This was started by the already mentioned works by
Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1996) who rst showed how models with unin-
surable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings in general equilibrium could generate
the observed fact that wealth is more concentrated than earnings. The fail-
ure to match the observed wealth concentration spurred a number of papers
that, building on the original framework, added several possible explanatory
mechanisms. These included entrepreneurship, like in Quadrini (2000) and
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), bequest motives like in De Nardi (2004), het-
erogeneous preferences like in Krusell and Smith (1998) or the assumption of
earnings risk large enough to match the observed earnings variability, like in
Casta~neda, Daz-Gimenez and Ros-Rull (2003). Among the body of research
mentioned above, the current paper is particularly related to works of Daz,
Pijoan-Mas and Ros-Rull (2003), Carroll (2000) and Francis (2009). The
relationship with Daz et al. (2003) stems from the fact that both papers
analyze the eect of an alternative preference specication on both precau-
tionary savings and the concentration of wealth. The main dierence with
that paper is that they explore the role of habit formation while here we fo-
cus on the introduction of multiple consumption goods with non-homothetic
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preferences dened over the goods.1 On the other hand Carroll (2000) and
Francis (2009) both propose non-homothetic preferences as a possible expla-
nation of wealth inequality. In their work though, these are introduced in
the form of having wealth in the utility function, which gives another saving
motive on top of precautionary saving. Also, Carroll (2000) does not explore
the quantitative implications of his idea, while Francis (2009) calibrates the
model by picking the parameters of the utility function over wealth to match
the Gini index of the wealth distribution itself. The present paper, besides
focusing only on the precautionary saving motive, also chooses a rigorous
calibration procedure where the parameters of the utility function are based
on independent empirical evidence on the share of the two goods in total
consumption.
The third strand of literature that is related to the current research con-
sists of macroeconomic models that have put to dierent uses the assumption
of multiple, non-durable consumption goods. Among them Ait-Sahalia et al.
(2004) using a more restrictive denition of luxury goods | high end luxuries
| show that the empirical correlation between the equity return and con-
sumption of these goods may reconcile the observed equity premium with a
limited degree of risk aversion. Wachter and Yogo (2010) use non-homothetic
preferences to explain why the share of risky assets is increasing in wealth.
Finally Aguiar and Bils (2014) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) use the mul-
tiple goods framework to address issues of consumption inequality. Aguiar
and Bils (2014) nd empirically that once this distinction is made consump-
tion inequality tracks very closely the increase in income inequality observed
1Daz and Luengo-Prado (2010) study the wealth distribution in a two goods model.
In their case though the second good is a durable, more precisely housing.
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in the recent decades. Aguiar and Hurst (2013) focus on goods with dier-
ent elasticity of substitution of time and expenditures in their production to
explain the evolution of consumption inequality over the life-cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents
the model, section 3 is devoted to explaining the calibration strategy, section
4 presents the results. In section 5 a brief conclusion is outlined. Finally, an
appendix describes the numerical methods used to solve the model.
2 Model
We consider a standard neoclassical economy with no aggregate uncer-
tainty which allows us to focus on steady-states. We assume that there is
a measure one of innitely lived agents. Agents are ex-ante identical and
receive idiosyncratic shocks to their endowment of labor units. This feature
is standard and is the source of microeconomic uncertainty that leads to
precautionary savings. We assume that there are two types of goods: basic
goods and luxury goods or simply luxuries.
A description of the production side of the economy is given in section
2.1, more details about the household's preferences are given in section 2.2,
the household's optimal decision problem is described in section 2.3, while
the denition of the general equilibrium of the economy is given in section
2.4.
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2.1 Technology
Each period households receive a shock to their eciency units of la-
bor that we denote with e. We assume that e belongs to a nite set E =
fe1; :::::; eng and that it follows a rst-order Markov process that we can de-
scribe with a transition probability matrix . Aggregate output is produced
via a standard neoclassical, constant return to scale production function
Y = F (K;L), where Y is aggregate output, K is the total amount of capital
and L is the total amount of labor used in production. The output can be
indierently used for investment and as both a luxury and a basic consump-
tion good. Hence the relative price of those goods will be 1 and the quantity
produced and consumed will be entirely demand driven. As it will become
clear in the next subsection, in a stationary environment like the one consid-
ered in this paper, the relative price of the two goods cannot be separately
identied, hence this assumption is innocuous.2 Capital depreciates at a rate
 2 [0; 1].
2.2 Preferences
Households are endowed with one unit of time. They do not value leisure
hence they supply this unit inelastically to the market. They can consume
two types of goods which we call basic and luxury goods. In each period
consumption of quantity b of basic goods and of quantity l of luxury goods
2In other words, one could introduce a friction in the model that makes the relative
price of the two goods dierent from 1, but this price would be constant and its eect
would not be identied separately from the eect of one of the preference parameters. For
this reason it is legitimate to assume no friction which implies a relative price of basics
and luxuries equal to 1.
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gives utility
U(b; l) =
h
b1  +
(1  )
1   l
1 
i 1
1 
(1)
where   0 is the utility weight on l and the two curvature parameters satisfy
the restriction    > 1. The intra-temporal utility index is embedded in
the household's inter-temporal utility as:
u(b; l) =
U(b; l)1 
1   (2)
where  > 1 controls risk-aversion. This specication follows Wachter and
Yogo (2010) and has been used in a number of settings to model the fact that
as households grow wealthier, they spend relatively more on some goods than
on others.
The allocation of total consumption expenditures between basic and lux-
ury goods is entirely determined by the properties of the intra-temporal util-
ity index. If we let q be the relative price of l in units of b, then the household
will solve in each period the problem:
max
b;l
U(b; l) (3)
subject to the constraint:
b+ ql = c (4)
where c denotes total consumption expenditures. This problem has rst order
conditions:
Ul
Ub
=
l 
b 
= q (5)
which once substituted in the constraints and then in the intra-temporal
utility index allow us to write the latter as a function of the relative price q
and of the total amount of consumption expenditures c as:
bU(c; q) = max
b+ql=c
U(b; l) (6)
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In turn this leads to the following period utility function:
bu(c; q) = bU(c; q)1 
1   (7)
Two observations can be made about this representation of utility.3 First
when  =  it collapses to the usual homothetic case. Second this utility
function displays declining relative risk aversion.4 When the agent is very
poor it consumes mostly basic goods and its risk aversion is close to . As
the household becomes wealthier the share of luxury consumption increases
and risk aversion converges towards the value:
(1  ) +   
1   <  (8)
Also, the relative price of luxuries q and the parameter  both determine
the average share of luxury in total consumption, hence in a stationary en-
vironment like the one considered here they cannot be separately identied.
For this reason we can simply set q = 1 and drop it from the maximized
intra-temporal utility function that can then be written bu(c). 5
2.3 Household's optimal program
There are no state contingent markets to insure the household specic
shock e. The household then has access to a single asset that pays interest
at a rate r. We denote the amount of the asset held by the household by a
and we assume that a 2 A  [a;1), thus we assume an exogenous borrow-
ing constraint. The absence of state-contingent markets and the presence of
3The function bU(c; q) does not have an analytical representation and is thus evaluated
numerically as it will be explained in the Appendix.
4See Wachter and Yogo (2010).
5The fact that q = 1 is insured by the assumption about technology in section 2.1.
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borrowing constraints are the necessary ingredients to depart from the stan-
dard representative agent framework which enables us to study distributional
issues.
Given the preferences and asset structure specied above we directly write
the household's optimization problem in dynamic programming form. Since
we only look at steady-states, the individual household's state variables are
the shock to its endowment of eciency units of labor and its assets, that is
the pair fe; ag. The problem that the household solves reads:
v(a; e) = max
c0;a0a
bu(c) + X
e0
e;e0v(a
0; e0) (9)
subject to:
a0 = ew + (1 + r)a  c (10)
where w is the rental rate for eciency units of labor, r is the rental rate on
capital and the function bu has been dened in the previous section.
This problem gives rise to two decision rules: a0 = ga(a; e) for asset
holdings and c = gc(a; e) for consumption expenditures. The exogenous
Markov process for the eciency units of labor together with the individual
decision rules determine a Markov process for the state variables. Letting
s = fa; eg be the set of individual state variables and S = fA  Eg be
the set of values that those state variables can take, dene B the -algebra
generated in S by the open sets. A probability measure x over B can be
used to describe the economy by stating how many households are of each
type. Dene a function Q(s;B) that gives the probability that a type fsg
has of becoming a type in a set B  B. The function Q can then be used to
describe how the economy evolves over time by giving a probability measure
for tomorrow x0 given the probability measure x today. The rule that governs
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this transition from x to x0 is given by:
x0(B) =
Z
S
Q(s;B)dx (11)
Ros-Rull (1999) shows that if the earnings shock process has a unique sta-
tionary distribution, so has the economy. Moreover this unique stationary
distribution is the limit to which the economy converges, starting from any
initial distribution.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the description of the model in the previous subsections we are
now ready to dene the steady-state equilibrium for this economy. For-
mally a steady-state equilibrium will be a set of value and decision functions
fv; ga; gcg and a measure of households x such that: (i) Factor inputs are
obtained by aggregating over households, that is, K = A =
R
S
adx and
L =
R
S
edx; (ii) factor prices are equal to the factor's marginal produc-
tivity, formally: r = F1(K;L)    and w = F2(K;L); (iii) given K and
L | hence factor prices | the functions fv; ga; gcg solve the household's
optimal program described in Section 2.3; (iv) the goods market clears:R
S
[gc(s) + ga(s)]dx = F (K;L) + (1   )K, where c(s) = b(s) + l(s) and
(v), the measure of households is stationary: x(B) =
R
S
Q(s; B)dx for all
B  B.
3 Calibration
This paper explores the role of luxury consumption in the quantitative de-
termination of precautionary savings and in shaping the wealth distribution
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in an innite horizon framework. We thus take as a point of departure in the
calibration the model economies studied in Aiyagari (1994), the seminal pa-
per in this area. The model period is taken to be one year and the subjective
discount factor  is set at 0.96. The coecient  that determines the cur-
vature of the period utility index dened over the maximized intra-temporal
utility of consumption expenditures is set at a value of 3, corresponding to
the intermediate risk-aversion case in Aiyagari (1994). Thus in the limit a
very poor agent that consumed almost entirely basic goods would exhibit a
coecient of relative risk aversion of 3. The capital share of income  is
taken to be 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital  is set at 0.08. With
respect to the labor earnings process we dene a benchmark case where we
take it to follow an AR(1) process in logarithms and then discretize it using
the procedure outlined in Tauchen (1986).6 The AR(1) process is completely
dened by two parameters, the autocorrelation coecient and the coecient
of variation. We take the former to be 0.6 and the latter to be 0.4, both are
values among those used by Aiyagari (1994).
The parameters related to the specic contribution of the paper are those
that determine the share of basic and luxury goods in total consumption
expenditures. To calibrate those parameters we start from data presented in
Wachter and Yogo (2010). The two authors use the Consumer Expenditures
Survey for the period 1982-2003 as a source of detailed data on consump-
tion of dierent non-durable goods and services. They categorize them into
several groups and for each they estimate a regression of the expenditure
share on several explanatory variables, including total consumption expendi-
6Strictly speaking in the description of the model we directly used the discretized form.
Here we explain how the nite-state Markov chain is obtained
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tures.7 Following standard demand analysis they then classify luxury goods
and services as those whose share raises with total consumption expenditures
and basic goods and services as those whose share decreases with total con-
sumption expenditures. Aggregating over the dierent categories they can
thus provide expenditure shares for basics and luxuries at dierent points of
the consumption expenditures distribution. They estimate that the share of
basics goods for the median household is 47 percent with a variation from 57
percent in the bottom quartile of the consumption distribution to 35 percent
for the top quartile. We take those shares as the targets for our calibration
and proceed as follows. We try to match the median share as precisely as
possible. This share can be matched basically by an appropriate choice of
the parameter . The parameters  and  on the other hand are mainly
involved in the determination of how the expenditure share of basic goods
varies over the consumption distribution. In practice we follow Wachter and
Yogo (2010) in setting a low value of 1.1 for . Then we determine  so that
the dierence between the share of basic consumption in total expenditures
at the top and bottom quartile of the consumption distribution is the same
22 percent value found in the data. The chosen values in the baseline case
are 75 for  and 11.5 for .
The parameter values for this benchmark calibration are reported in ta-
ble 1 which is divided in two panels, the top panel with the parameters
that are common to both the homothetic and the non-homothetic model,
and the bottom panel with the parameters specic to the non-homothetic
7They identify the following categories. For goods: Food at home, food away from
home, clothing and shoes, fuel oil and coal, gasoline, other non durable goods. For services:
Housing, household operation, transportation, personal care, personal business, recreation.
15
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value
 0.96
 3
 0.36
 0.08
e 0.6
e 0.4
 75
 11.5
 1.1
model. As it will turn out, moving to non-homothetic preferences changes
the equilibrium interest rate, hence the incentive to save at dierent points
of the wealth distribution. Since we want to study the eect of this class of
preferences on the wealth distribution, and in order to separate the direct
eect of preferences from the indirect eect of the change in the equilibrium
interest rate on wealth dispersion, we also run a second version of the model
with non homothetic preferences where the discount rate is adjusted to keep
the capital-output ratio | hence the interest rate | at the same level as in
the benchmark homothetic model. In this latter case  needs to take a value
of 0.9652.
In later sections we also provide results for economies where the earnings
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process shows a lot more dispersion than the one in the seminal Aiyagari's
paper. This is a needed extension since the wealth dispersion generated in
Aiyagari (1994) is substantially less than in the data among else precisely be-
cause the earnings dispersion is too small under standard AR(1) processes.8
Given our focus on the marginal eect of introducing non-homothetic pref-
erences on the the wealth distribution we think it is a necessary step to also
explore this issue with a model that can get closer to the empirical wealth
dispersion. Details of the earnings process and the necessary adjustment in
parameters are given in the corresponding result sections.
4 Results
Results are presented in two sections. In section 4.1 we describe the re-
sult of the model that uses the labor earnings process taken from Aiyagari
(1994). In section 4.2 we explore the results of two model economies that use
two alternative earnings processes that generate a higher earnings variability,
one consistent with SCF data and the second consistent with PSID data. In
each case we report results from three dierent economies. First we consider
an economy with standard homothetic, constant relative risk aversion pref-
erences. Second we explore an economy that is identical to the former except
that it has non-homothetic preferences as specied in section 2.2. Notice
that the rst economy can be obtained as a special case of the second one by
setting  equal to . Third we simulate an economy that has non-homothetic
8Budria Rodrguez et al. (2002) report that the coecient of variation of earnings in
the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (1998) is 2.65 while earnings dispersion in Aiyagari
(1994) | and in our benchmark calibration { is only 0.4.
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preferences with the same preference parameters as the second one but whose
subjective discount factor is adjusted so that the capital output ratio is the
same as the one in the rst economy. In this way we can isolate the di-
rect eect of non-homothetic preferences on the wealth distribution from the
indirect eect induced by the change in the size of precautionary savings.
4.1 Baseline
In this subsection we report results for the economies that use the Aiya-
gari's earnings process. Given the parametrization described in the calibra-
tion section agents in the homothetic preference economy exhibit a relative
risk aversion coecient of 3. In the non-homothetic economy this will be
the limit of the coecient of relative risk-aversion for a very poor agent that
consumes virtually only basic goods. This coecient declines as the share of
luxuries increases. Substituting the calibrated parameters in equation (8),
we can see that it converges to 1.019.
Table 2 reports average statistics for the baseline homothetic economy
and for comparison for the corresponding representative agent economy.9 All
quantities are normalized by output in the deterministic economy for easiness
of comparison. Aggregate assets are 2.96 and the interest rate is 4.17 percent
in the deterministic economy. In the benchmark homothetic economy assets
go up to 3.51 and the interest rate is reduced to 2.92 percent. Capital thus
increases by 18.5 percent. This increase can be attributed to precautionary
savings. Measures of precautionary savings in the literature vary quite a bit.
9The representative agent economy has the same parameters as the baseline economy
and the labor endowment xed at the unconditional mean of the earnings process of the
model with uninsurable earnings risk.
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Table 2: Main statistics: Benchmark and deterministic economies
Deterministic Benchmark % change
Aggregate assets 2.96 3.51 + 18.5 %
Output 1.00 1.06 + 6.3 %
Capital/output ratio 2.96 3.30 + 11.5 %
Interest rate (%) 4.17 2.92 - 42.8 %
C.V. of wealth { 0.696 {
Gini of wealth { 0.372 {
For example Cagetti (2000) nds that up to age 50 savings for precautionary
reasons represent almost all savings and that at the time of retirement, wealth
is twice as high than in a world without precautionary savings. On the
other hand Huggett (1996) nds a result of just a few percentage points.
Our estimate thus falls in between those. This said, in our context the
measure of precautionary savings would have varied substantially, had we
chosen a more extreme parametrization of earning risk and risk aversion
among those presented by Aiyagari (1994). Thus we see this gure essentially
as a benchmark against which to compare the eect of introducing non-
homothetic preferences.
In table 3 we thus report results for the benchmark homothetic model
with the Aiyagari's earnings process and for two versions of the correspond-
ing non-homothetic model. The labels B, NH and NHA in this table |like
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in the subsequent tables 6 and 8 | stand respectively for benchmark ho-
mothetic model, non-homothetic model and non-homothetic model with the
subjective discount factor adjusted so as to keep the wealth-output ratio
constant. Hence columns 2 and 3 consider a version of the model whose pa-
rameters are exactly the same as the ones of the homothetic model, except
of course for those dening preferences over basic and luxury goods. Total
asset holdings move from 3.51 to 3.31 and the interest rate increases from
2.92 percent to 3.38 percent. In terms of precautionary savings this means
that moving from the homothetic case to the non-homothetic case reduces
them from 18.5 percent to 11.8 percent, that is, a reduction of about a third.
Qualitatively this result could be anticipated since in the non-homothetic
model risk aversion almost coincides with the one of the homothetic model
for very poor agents that consume almost entirely basic goods and then de-
clines as the share of luxuries increases, hence the average agent is less risk
averse. The interest of the result is thus in the quantitative gure, which
shows a substantial change.
The last two rows of table 3 show results concerning the wealth distribu-
tion. Both measures of wealth concentration show a more equal distribution
in the non-homothetic model. The coecient of variation declines from 0.696
to 0.648, that is, by about 7 percent and the Gini index of wealth declines
from 0.372 to 0.349 a decline of about 6 percent. These gures are non neg-
ligible albeit not big. A priori the sign of the variation is not clear. On
the one hand in the non-homothetic model risk-aversion declines with the
share of luxury consumption, hence with wealth; thus suggesting relatively
more savings for precautionary reasons for the poor agents. On the other
20
Table 3: Main statistics: Benchmark and non-homothetic economies
B NH % change NHA % change
NH B
B
NHA B
B
Aggregate assets 3.51 3.31 -5.6 % 3.51 {
Output 1.06 1.05 -1.6 % 1.06 {
Capital/output ratio 3.30 3.16 -4.2 % 3.30 {
Interest rate (%) 2.92 3.38 +15.8% 2.91 {
Precautionary savings 18.5 % 11.8 % -36.2% 11.8 % {
C.V. of wealth 0.696 0.648 -6.9 % 0.654 -6.0 %
Gini of wealth 0.372 0.349 -6.2 % 0.351 -5.7 %
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hand, as it was pointed out by Browning and Crossley (2000) the elastic-
ity of inter-temporal substitution increases with the share of luxuries. In
their words \luxuries are easier to postpone", hence a wealthy agent facing
a negative earnings shock might more easily cut consumption slowing down
wealth decumulation. The balance of these two forces at dierent points of
the distribution determines the eect on wealth concentration which in this
example is reduced.
The last two columns of the table report results for an economy with
non-homothetic preferences where the subjective discount factor is changed
so as to restore the same interest rate as the benchmark economy. This would
isolate the eect of preferences on the wealth distribution from the indirect
eect of the change in the interest rate. To obtain this, given the reduction
in aggregate assets in the non-homothetic model one needs to make agents a
little more patient and raise  to 0.9652. The coecient of variation of wealth
is in this case 0.654 and the Gini index is 0.351, both representing a reduction
in the measure of wealth concentration of about 6 percent compared to the
benchmark homothetic model. These gures are very close to those for the
constant  economy, hence most of the reduction in wealth concentration
is a direct eect of the change in preferences. Finally gure 1 reports the
Lorenz curves for the three economies. Consistent with the values of the Gini
index and coecient of variation we see that the continuous curve for the
homothetic model lies further from the 45 degree line that signals perfectly
equally distributed wealth, while the dashed and dash-dotted lines lie closer
indicating less wealth concentration.
The models considered so far exhibit a Gini coecient of wealth in the
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Figure 1: Lorenz curve for assets: Benchmark earnings process economies
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range of 0.35 to 0.37, well below the value in the data that according to
Budra-Rodrguez et al. (2002) was 0.803 in the 1998 issue of the Survey
of Consumer Finance. A key reason for this discrepancy is that earnings
concentration is much lower in the process we have used than in the data:
the Gini index is 0.22 in the model versus 0.611 in the data. For this reason we
revisit the results thus far obtained under two alternative earnings processes
that display substantially greater volatility.
4.2 Economies with high earnings variability
In this section we consider two economies that display higher variability
of earnings, matching respectively those that can be found in the SCF and
in the PSID.
4.2.1 SCF earnings process
In the economy based on the SCF we take the labor earnings process
used by Daz et al. (2003). The realizations of the earnings process and the
transition probabilities between states are reported in table 4. The implied
Gini index for earnings is 0.588, very close to the value of 0.611 in the 1998
issue of the SCF. More details about the distributional properties of this pro-
cess in comparison with the data are given in Table 5 where selected points
of the Lorenz curve for earnings are given.10 As it can be seen the process
matches closely the share of earnings of the top 10 and especially the top
20 percent of the distribution. It overestimates somewhat the share of the
10The empirical distribution is taken from Budra-Rodrguez et al. (2002) and is based
on the 1998 issue of the SCF.
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bottom 40 percent | by 3.4 percentage points |, and it underestimates a
bit the share of the top 1 percent, in this case by 7 percentage points. Over-
all we can say that it does a quite satisfactory job, taking into account that
with 3 states only it is very parsimonious. The choice of this process must be
taken as illustrative of what the implications of non-homothetic preferences
are for precautionary savings and the wealth distribution when earnings risk
is taken to the extreme. The adoption of this process requires two further
adjustments in the choice of parameters. First we want the baseline economy
with homothetic preferences to generate the same capital output ratio as the
benchmark economy with the Aiyagari's earnings process, hence we need to
reduce the subjective discount factor  to 0.852 to compensate for the much
higher desire to save in the face of the heightened earnings risk. Second,
with higher earnings variability also comes higher variability in consumption
expenditures. For this reason, in order to match the usual targets of the
median share of expenditures on basic goods and its gradient across con-
sumption quartiles an adjustment in the parameters  and  is also needed.
The chosen values, as shown in the last row of table 4, are 1.7 and 1.55 re-
spectively. With these parameters, risk aversion for an agent that consumed
virtually only luxuries would converge to 1.36.
Table 6 reports the results. In the rst column we can see the main statis-
tics for the benchmark economy with homothetic preferences. The values of
assets, output, the capital-output ratio and the interest rate are by construc-
tion equal to those of the benchmark economy with the Aiyagari's earnings
process.11 Precautionary savings though, now stands at the very large value
11Occasionally one may see tiny dierences in the tables for values that are supposed
to be equal by construction. These are due to the precision of the root nding algorithm,
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Table 4: Parameters: Benchmark and non-homothetic economies.
High earnings variability I
e1, e2, e3 0.179 0.949 8.351
0.992 0.008 0.000
e;e0 0.009 0.980 0.011
0.000 0.083 0.917
   
0.852 1.7 1.1 1.55
Table 5: The earnings distribution: data and high earnings risk
model I
Percentiles bottom 40 top 20 top 10 top 1
Data 3.8 60.2 42.9 15.3
Model 7.2 62.7 53.2 8.4
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of 156.2 percent, a consequence of the very high risk entailed by the earn-
ings process.12 The measures of inequality, have now increased substantially
and the Gini index, at 0.819 is close to the 0.803 in the SCF data. Moving
to the second and third column of the table we see that once we introduce
non-homothetic preferences, aggregate capital and the capital-output ratio
fall dramatically by about 52 and 37 percent. Consequently precautionary
saving is reduced to about 80 percent. The interpretation is that with non-
homothetic preferences risk aversion declines with the share of luxuries in
total expenditures, hence also with wealth. With the high earnings volatility
process wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of the very rich. In turn
these will hold a large amount of wealth, devote a large fraction of expendi-
tures to luxury goods, hence they will also be little averse to risk. As a result
the reduction in aggregate savings and total capital will be large. The most
interesting result though, concerns the measures of inequality. As we can see
from the bottom two rows, the coecient of variation and the Gini index
of wealth increase by 7.1 and 4 percent respectively. This result stands in
contrast with the model that used the low variability earnings process where
measures of inequality decreased when we moved from the homothetic to the
non-homothetic model.
The last two columns of the table present the results for the model with
non-homothetic preferences but with the subjective discount factor adjusted
compounded by rounding in reporting the results.
12Recall here that we compute precautionary savings as the percentage dierence in
total assets between the benchmark economy and an otherwise equally parameterized
deterministic economy. The latter now features the low value of 0.852 for , needed to
keep capital constant across all the homothetic benchmark economies that we consider.
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Table 6: Main statistics: Benchmark and non-homothetic
economies. High earnings variability I
B NH % change NHA % change
NH B
B
NHA B
B
Aggregate assets 3.49 1.69 -51.6% 3.48 {
Output 1.06 0.82 -23.0% 1.06 {
Capital/output ratio 3.29 2.07 -37.1% 3.28 {
Interest rate (%) 2.94 9.41 +220.1% 2.96 {
Precautionary savings 156.2% 80.1% -48.7% 156.2% {
C.V. of wealth 2.424 2.596 +7.1% 2.494 +2.89%
Gini of wealth 0.819 0.852 +4.0% 0.840 +2.56%
to 0.918 so as to keep aggregate capital equal to the one in the homothetic
model. Clearly all aggregate statistics are equal to those of the benchmark
homothetic model. The only dierence regards the Gini index and the coef-
cient of variation of wealth. As we can see from the last two rows we still
notice an increase of these two measures over the homothetic model, the in-
crease though is smaller: 2.9 and 2.5 percent respectively. Figure 2 shows the
Lorenz curves for the three high variability economies. Consistently with the
Gini index we see that the curves referring to the non-homothetic economies
are further from the 45 degree lines, showing that the latter economies pro-
duce more wealth inequality than the homothetic economy when earnings
risk is very high. Also visual inspection of the curves suggests that it is the
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Figure 2: Lorenz curve for assets: High earnings variability process (SCF) economies
90-99 percentiles where the gains in shares of wealth are concentrated.13
4.2.2 PSID earnings process
In this second economy we take the earnings process used by Quadrini
(2000). Quadrini estimates an AR(1) process on PSID data, assuming that
agents are of two types with dierent average lifetime earnings. He then char-
acterizes the innite living agents of his model as a succession of generations
of expected duration 35 years and sets the probability of transition across
earnings types so as to match the intergenerational correlation of earnings of
13This statement is backed by the data used to construct the gure, which are not
reported for the sake of brevity.
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0.5 reported for example in Solon (1992).14 The transition matrix and the
value of the endowment of labor eciency units in each state are reported
in table 7. The resulting Gini coecient for earnings is 0.39 which matches
very closely the one for the PSID in the years 1970-1992 reported in Quadrini
(2000). This value falls between the one in the Aiyagari's economy and the
one in the SCF economy and must be taken as illustrative of a case where
dispersion in wealth, hence expenditures is closer to the data while not being
so extreme as in the process used in Daz et al. (2003).
Like in the previous case we rst simulate an economy with homothetic
preferences where we adjust  so that we keep the same aggregate assets
of the benchmark economy with Aiyagari's earnings process. In this case
the value of  needs to be set at 0.928. Then we run two versions of the
non-homothetic economy: one that keeps the same parametrization as the
benchmark and the second that further adjusts the subjective discount factor
so as to keep aggregate capital constant. The change in the distribution of
consumption expenditures also requires a change in the parameters  and 
that determine the median share of basic goods in total consumption and its
variation between the bottom and top quartile of the consumption distribu-
tion, that is, our targets in the calibration. As shown in the last row of table
7 we now set  = 1:7 and  = 1:85. Given equation 8 this implies that the
limiting value of risk aversion for an agent consuming almost entirely luxury
goods is 1.23.
Results for the economies described in this section are reported in table
8. Looking at the rst column of the table we see that precautionary savings
in the homothetic economy amount to 76.8 percent. As for the inequality
14See Quadrini (2000) for details on how the process is constructed.
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statistics the coecient of variation of wealth is 0.939 and the Gini index
is 0.516. Looking at the second column we see that when we move to the
non-homothetic model the capital-output ratio falls by 21.3 percent and ag-
gregate wealth falls by 31.2 percent, leaving precautionary savings at only
21.7 percent. Again this is a consequence of the fact that earnings, hence
wealth, display a substantial degree of concentration. With non-homothetic
preferences risk aversion declines with consumption expenditures leading to
a substantial reduction in savings by the wealthy. The measures of wealth
inequality increase as well but the increase is in this case modest: 2.2 percent
for the coecient of variation and 0.4 percent for the Gini index. The fourth
column of table 8 shows the results for the non-homothetic model where we
readjust the subjective discount factor to keep aggregate assets unchanged.
Looking at the last two rows we see that the coecient of variation of wealth
is 0.953 and the Gini index is 0.518, representing an increase over the bench-
mark model of 1.5 and 0.4 percent respectively. Also in this case then the
introduction of two goods with dierent expenditures elasticities leads to an
increase in wealth inequality, even though in this case the increase is small.
This is conrmed by gure 3 that displays the Lorenz curve for the three
economies. As it can be seen the three curves are almost overlapping and
indeed do cross each other.
5 Conclusions
There is by now a large literature devoted to the study of precautionary
savings and wealth inequality based on models with exogenous stochastic
earnings that are uninsurable. This literature typically assumes one single
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Table 7: Parameters: Benchmark and non-homothetic economies.
High earnings variability II
e1, e2, e3, e4 0.246 0.531 1.023 2.201
e;e0 = 0.743 0.250 0.005 0.002
0.250 0.743 0.002 0.005
0.005 0.002 0.743 0.250
0.002 0.005 0.250 0.743
   
0.928 1.7 1.1 1.85
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Figure 3: Lorenz curve for assets: High earnings variability process (PSID) economies
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Table 8: Main statistics: Benchmark and non-homothetic
economies. High earnings variability II
B NH % change NHA % change
NH B
B
NHA B
B
Aggregate assets 3.49 2.40 -31.2% 3.50 {
Output 1.06 0.93 -12.6% 1.06 {
Capital/output ratio 3.29 2.59 -21.3% 3.30
Interest rate (%) 2.94 5.89 +100.3% 2.92
Precautionary savings 76.8% 21.7% -71.7% +76.8% {
C.V. of wealth 0.939 0.960 +2.24% 0.953 +1.49%
Gini of wealth 0.516 0.518 +0.39% 0.518 +0.30%
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homogeneous good. In the current paper we have moved one step beyond
by assuming that there are two goods in the economy | a basic and a
luxury consumption good | with non-homothetic intra-temporal preferences
over the two goods. Based on work by Wachter and Yogo (2010) we have
calibrated those preferences so as to match the share of expenditures on
basic goods for the median consumer and its variation over quartiles of the
consumption distribution.
We nd that compared to an otherwise equally parameterized model with
homothetic preferences, the two goods model generates a lower amount of
precautionary savings. The reduction in precautionary saving is always sig-
nicant. The eect on the wealth distribution on the other hand is am-
biguous. In the non-homothetic model risk aversion declines with the share
of luxury in total consumption, hence with total consumption expenditures
and wealth. This works towards a less concentrated wealth distribution. At
the same time the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution increases with
wealth, so that wealthier agents can more easily cut consumption in the face
of negative earnings shocks. This second force works towards a more con-
centrated wealth distribution. As it turns out the overall eect depends on
the amount of earnings risk: wealth concentration is reduced for a moderate
amount of risk but is increased for large values of earnings risk. Whatever
the sign of the change though, quantitatively this change is not big, hence
these preferences do not seem to be likely candidate to substantially improve
our understanding of the wealth distribution.
There are several natural extensions of the ideas in this paper. One is the
application to a life-cycle setting to study savings over the life-cycle following
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the structural estimation approach of Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Also,
there is a considerable literature on consumption inequality, the nature of
earnings risk and the extent to which available insurance translate the latter
into the former. In light of the work by Aguiar and Bils (2013) it seems
promising to apply the current framework to this area of macroeconomics.
The latter is the object of an ongoing research eort but it is outside the
scope of this paper.
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Appendix: Numerical solution method
In this appendix we briey describe the numerical method adopted to
solve the model studied in this paper. The model and the associated solution
method are standard in most respects. The algorithm can be summarized
by the following steps:
(i) Guess an initial value for the interest rate r.
(ii) Solve the dynamic optimization problem described by equations 9 and
10.
(iii) Use the decision rule ga(a; e) and realizations of the exogenous process
for e to simulate the economy and obtain total asset holdings.
(iv) If total asset holdings match capital demand, then stop. Otherwise go
back to step (i) with a new guess for the interest rate.
The dynamic optimization problem is solved by value function iteration, the
value function is approximated by cubic splines and the static maximization
to be performed at each state space point uses Brent's (1973) algorithm.15
Successive guesses on the interest rate r are obtained following a simple
bisection scheme.
Where the solution method needs to deviate from standard practice is
at the evaluation of the ow of utility from current consumption. This is
because for each level of consumption utility cannot be simply evaluated as
15Given that the time to solve the household's dynamic programming problem with the
algorithm described in the text is small and comparable to the simulation time we refrain
from using faster methods, like Carroll's (2006) endogenous gridpoints algorithm.
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the power utility value of that level of consumption. This ow of utility is
instead the result of the solution of the problem:
max
b;l
U(b; l)
subject to the constraint:
b+ l = c
Solving this problem each time the maximization routine in the dynamic
programming problem needs to evaluate the utility of consumption level c
would make the algorithm exceedingly slow. For this reason we work with
an approximation of the period utility function that can be computed once
and for all at the beginning of the algorithm. In practice we dene a grid
for consumption expenditures fcigni=1. For each value of expenditures ci we
solve the problem:
max
b;l
U(b; l)
subject to the constraint:
b+ l = ci
The solution to this problem delivers a value of the maximized intra-temporal
utility function bu(ci) and a cubic spline is tted on the sequence of points
fbu(ci)gni=1 thus obtained. This cubic spline is then used to evaluate the period
utility ow from consumption expenditures.
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